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Entry of Alternative Fuels 
in a Volatile U.S. Gasoline Market 
Dmitry V. Vedenov, James A. Duffield, 
and Michael E. Wetzstein 
Dramatic increases in levels and volatility of gasoline prices observed in recent years 
may create market incentives  for adoption of alternative  fuels characterized by lower 
price volatility. This hypothesis is investigated by  applying the real-options pricing 
approach to develop optimal thresholds for switching from conventional gasoline to 
alternative fuels such as ethanol blends. The main result of  the paper is that given 
the historical price patterns of  conventional gasoline and ethanol, switching to 
ethanol blends is an economically sound decision provided this does not decrease 
efficiency of the vehicle. Analysis of  data subsamples during the periods of  higher 
volatility of gasoline prices (Gulf War and War on Terrorism) provides even stronger 
support for this result. 
Key  words: alternative fuels, decision making under uncertainty, ethanol, price 
volatility, real options 
Introduction 
Since the  turn of the 21st century, the  volatility in gasoline prices causing price "spikes" 
has become increasingly common (Ashton and Upton, 2004). Gasoline prices tend to 
exhibit asymmetry, with steep price spikes followed by gentle declines. U.S. Energy 
Information Administration data confirm this price asymmetry, where retail prices 
typically rise more rapidly than they fall (Cook, 1999).  Such volatility harms the entire 
macroeconomy and is at  least partially responsible for the U.S. economy falling into the 
2001 recession. As reported by  Ferderer (1996), oil  price volatility, which directly 
impacts gasoline volatility, affects the entire U.S. economy through sectoral shocks and 
uncertainty. Irreversible investment decisions adversely affected by this volatility have 
placed a significant drag on the economy. This is consistent with the results of Kneller 
and Young (2001) who found that oil price volatility is robustly negatively correlated 
with economic growth. Not surprisingly, corporate stock prices also respond inversely 
to increased price volatility of petroleum products (Sadorsky, 1999). 
Alternative  hypotheses have emerged as  explanations for the increased gasoline price 
volatility. Crude oil costs are certainly a contributing factor, but Speir (2004) concludes 
oil price volatility alone explains less than half of gasoline price movements. This result 
is supported by Ashton and Upton (2004)  who cite changes in inventory canying levels, 
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increased concentration and vertical integration of  the petroleum industry, and the 
advent of boutique fuels as  major factors in increased price volatility. 
With world demand for oil continuing to increase and U.S. refiners operating at  full 
capacity, a tight market for gasoline currently exists (Speir, 2004). In such a market, 
price volatility is reinforced when a boutique of fuel types creates unique local markets 
with barriers that prevent the reallocation of  fuels for meeting changes in short-run 
regional demands (Hutzler and Shore, 2002). 
With upward-trending oil prices and  heightened concerns over energy security 
stemming from the 9/11 terrorists attacks, expanding domestic renewable fuel produc- 
tion has become a major policy objective for the United States. Renewable fuels are 
generally more expensive than their petroleum counterparts and require government 
support in  order to compete in  the U.S. fuel market. For example, since the late 1980s, 
ethanol producers have enjoyed a motor fuel tax  credit, currently standing at  $0.51 per 
gallon. 
Efforts to promote renewable fuel production have intensified in the past few years, 
as  the U.S. Congress and many states have adopted numerous policies to increase the 
use of  domestic ethanol and biodiesel in the U.S. transportation sector (Collins and 
Duffield, 2005; North Carolina Solar Center, 2005). In addition, environmental regula- 
tions, such as  the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, have been passed to encourage 
the  replacement of petroleum fuels  with renewable fuels to  address air  quality concerns. 
Recently, ethanol demand received a major boost when a petroleum fuel oxygenate 
called methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) used to manufacture reformulated gasoline1 
was banned in California because it was contaminating groundwater (Blue Ribbon 
Panel on Oxygenates in Gasoline, 1999). MTBE has  been replaced with an  ethanol 
additive, the only other oxygenate available that does not contaminate groundwater. 
Following California's lead, 24 other states  have also banned MTBE over the past few 
years, resulting in a significant expansion in the U.S. ethanol market. 
Increasingly, renewable energy policies are  being implemented to help address  energy 
supply uncertainty. Policy makers tend to focus on energy supply and price differences 
between renewable fuels and  petroleum fuels when developing policy incentives. Little 
attention, however, has been given to energy price volatility in this context. In the 
presence of volatile gasoline prices, competitive market forces may speed up adoption 
of alternative fuels with lower price volatility as substitutes. 
A notable exception to this lack of related research is a paper by Tareen, Wetzstein, 
and Duffield (2000). The authors use a real-options approach to develop decision rules 
for switching from petroleum diesel to  biodiesel. Their study found volatility of alterna- 
tive diesel fuels is lower than that of petroleum diesel, concluding that price volatility 
should also be considered when evaluating policy options for substituting petroleum 
fuels with renewable fuels. However, the switching thresholds calculated by Tareen, 
Wetzstein, and Duffield proved to be too high to  justify transition at  the current levels 
of  prices. While their paper provided an interesting insight into the decision-making 
' Reformulated gasoline (RFG)  blends oxygenates into gasoline for emission reductions. RFG, which accounts for approxi- 
mately one-third of the U.S.  gasoline market (Lidderdale, 2003), generally reduces emissions of volatile organic compounds 
and toxic air pollutants. In 1995, RFG was mandated in the nine worst clean  ~ir~ct  non-attainment  cities &s  ~ngeles,  San 
Diego, Chicago, Houston, Milwaukee, Baltimore,  Philadelphia,  Hartford, and New York City). Other areas with a history of 
non-attainment have voluntarily joined the RFG program. Prior to 2004, MTBE had been the main additive used to manu- 
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process involved in adoption of alternative fuels, its practical application is somewhat 
limited. 
Biodiesel is more of  a niche fuel and its use is much less widespread than other 
alternative fuels such as ethanol. As reported by the National Biodiesel Board (2005), 
current U.S. dedicated production capacity of biodiesel is a record 0.11 billion gallons. 
However, this is far short of the 3.41 billion gallons of ethanol produced in 2004, which 
in turn is more than double ethanol production in 2000 (Renewable Fuels Association, 
2005). In contrast to biodiesel, blends of  ethanol with gasoline are emerging as major 
substitutes for U.S. total reliance on fossil fuels. Currently, a blend of 10%  ethanol with 
90% conventional gasoline (El0 or gasohol) is commercially available mainly in the 
Midwest corn-producing states for reducing carbon monoxide emissions during the 
winter months. While use of biodiesel requires modifications to the engine, gasoline1 
ethanol blends containing up to 10% ethanol by volume may be used in any vehicle 
without modification (U.S. Department of  Energy, 2005), i.e., such blends can be con- 
sidered as perfect substitutes for conventional gasoline. 
Ethanol blends with higher proportions of  ethanol-in  particular E85, which 
combines 85%  ethanol and 15%  conventional gasoline-require  additional modifications 
to the engine. However, the number of so-called "flex-fuel" cars which can operate both 
on conventional gasoline and E85 has been steadily increasing. Currently, more than 
5 million such vehicles are on the roads, with major car manufacturers expected to step 
up production in the future (Lundegaard, 2006). 
The ethanol industry is expanding rapidly. Twelve new ethanol plants were 
completed in 2004, increasing the total number of plants to 81. With another 16 plants 
under construction and plans to expand existing plants, ethanol capacity was expected 
to increase by another 750 million gallons in 2005 (Renewable Fuels Association, 2005). 
The U.S. Congress has recently passed the Domenici-Barton Energy Policy Act of 2005, 
which includes a renewable fuel standard (RFS). The Act mandates a renewable fuel 
phase-in, requiring fuel producers to manufacture a minimum amount of renewable fuel 
each year, starting at  4 billion gallons in 2006, and reaching 7.5 billion gallons in 2012. 
The RFS is expected to be satisfied by ethanol and biodiesel, but ethanol will likely 
provide the bulk of the mandated fuel. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 is considered to 
be the first step in revamping U.S. energy policy, and more legislation is expected to 
help address future energy requirements. 
This growing importance of ethanol, with the continuing discussion on the necessity 
and level of ethanol subsidies, requires an accurate evaluation of the market adoption 
potential of this major alternative fuel. Toward that end, our paper uses a real-options 
approach (similar  to Tareen, Wetzstein, and DuEeld, 2000) in order to develop econom- 
ically optimal thresholds for adoption of ethanol blends by taking into account both drift 
and volatility of gasoline and ethanol prices. Theoretical results establish an empirical 
link for measuring the tradeoff between a relatively more expensive commodity 
(alternative  fuel) with lower price drift and volatility and a lower but more volatile 
priced commodity (conventional gasoline). 
The remainder of  the paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines the 
theoretical approach to developing a decision rule for adoption of alternative fuels based 
on real-options methodology. The data and estimation procedures are then described, 
followed by a presentation of the results of our empirical analysis. Policy implications 
and concluding comments are provided in the final section. 4  April 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Methodology 
In this analysis, the decision threshold of when to switch to an alternative fuel is based 
on the Dixit and Pindyck (1994) approach for real-options pricing, and its application 
by Tareen, Wetzstein, and Duffield (2000L2  The underlying assumption here is that the 
adoption decision is made by a dynamically optimizing economic agent who wants to 
minimize expected future cost of fuel over a certain time horizon. For purposes of this 
analysis, the agent is assumed to be a wholesale buyer of fuel, e.g., a trucking company 
with a fleet of  medium-sized (gasoline-powered) trucks, a chain of  retail stores, or a 
delivery company. It  is also assumed the agent is considering switching  between conven- 
tional gasoline and ethanol blends that do not require engine modifications. 
From the standpoint of such an agent, the decision to switch to an alternative fuel at 
time t results in cost savings having the expected present value of: 
V(t) = E lt'*  [pc(r)  -  PA(T)]  exp(-rr)  dr, 
where Pc(r)  and PA(t)  are the prices of conventional and alternative fuels, respectively, 
at  time r, r is the discount rate, T is the planning horizon, and E is the expectation 
operator. If the prices are deterministic, then the optimal decision depends only on the 
sign of V and is essentially equivalent to the net present value approach. However, the 
situation is different when the prices fluctuate randomly over time. 
In particular, we assume that the prices of both conventional and alternative fuels 




where p is  the corresponding rate of change (drift),  a is  the volatility, and the subscripts 
C and  A refer to conventional and alternative fuels, respectively. The terms dz, and dzA 
represent increments of respective Wiener processes with properties: 
(4)  ~(dzi)  = ~(dz:)  = dt  and  E(dzcdzA)  = pdt , 
where p measures the correlation between PC  and PA. 
Using (2) and (3), the expected values of both prices at  time t can be derived as: 
(5)  EPc(t) = Pc(0)exp(pct)  and  EPA(t)  = PA(0)exp(pAt), 
where Pc(0)  and  PA(0)  are  the corresponding prices at  time zero. Substituting (5)  into (1) 
and integrating over time yields: 
The presentation in this section closely follows Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Tareen, Wetzstein, and Duffield (2000). 
Therefore some of the intermediate derivation steps are omitted due to space considerations.  Interested readers may refer 
to the above two sources for more detailed exposition. Vedenov, Dufield, and Wetzstein  Alternative Fuels in a Volatile US.  Gasoline Market  5 
which is the discounted present value of  savings from switching to the alternative fuel 
when the  current prices of conventional and alternative fuels are  PC  and  PA,  respectively. 
The optimal price threshold for switching can now be found by solving the Bellman 
equation: 
which requires the total expected return from the switch to be equal to the expected 
capital appreciation (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994,  p. 140).  Applying Ito's lemma to the  right- 
hand side of  (7) and substituting (2144) results in a partial differential equation for V, 
with PC  and PA as independent variables: 
Using the homogeneity of the  value function in both prices, (8)  can be reduced to an 
ordinary second-order linear differential equation: 
for ~(n),  where n = PAIPc  is the ratio of  prices, and 
The general solution to (9) is 
which, when combined with the limit condition v(n) +  -m  as n +  w,  the value-matching 
condition 
[cf. (6) and (lo)],  and the corresponding smooth-pasting condition 
can be solved for the optimal switching threshold: 6  April 2006 
where 
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and 
The optimal decision rule can then be formulated as follows. Switch to the alternative 




The data used for this study are weekly wholesale prices for conventional gasoline and 
ethanol at  three U.S. locations: Los Angeles, Houston (Gulf  Coast), and New York. These 
locations represent three of the  five Petroleum Administration for Defense Districts 
(PADDs) as classified by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2004). 
Because the calculated thresholds based on (11)  are similar for all three locations, only 
the Gulf Coast results are reported here.3  The conventional gasoline prices are taken 
from the "Weekly Petroleum Status Report" available at  the EIA website (EIA, 2004). 
The ethanol prices are collected from Renewable Fuel News (formerly Oxy-Fuel News). 
The ethanol price series are available from the first week of April 1989 through the  last 
week of May 2004 for New York, and from the last week of March 1989 through the last 
week of May 2004 for Los Angeles and Houston. The conventional gasoline price series 
starts  in February 1987. 
The nominal price series were deflated using monthly Producer Price Index (PPI)  data 
for refined petroleum products (series WPU057) available from the U.S. Department of 
Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics (2004)  website. The PPI was normalized so that  July 
2004 = 100. The real prices for ethanol blends with 10%  and 15%  ethanol concentrations 
(E  10 and E15, respectively) have been constructed as corresponding weighted averages 
of real price series for conventional gasoline and ethanol at  each location. 
Two additional subsamples have been created from each of the data series. The sub- 
samples match periods hypothesized to exhibit higher than average drift and volatility 
in gasoline prices. The first subsample includes observations from July 1990 through 
December 1991,  and corresponds  to the first Gulf War and a period of economic recession. 
The second subsample includes observations from July 2001 through May 2004, and 
encompasses events of  9/11, the recession of  2000-01,  as well as the second Gulf War 
(Terrorism War). The descriptive statistics of the real price series for gasoline and ethanol 
are  summarized in table 1  for both the full sample and the two subsamples (Gulf War and 
Terrorism War). Graphs of real prices for Gulf Coast conventional gasoline and ethanol 
from 1989-2004 are shown in figures 1  and 2, respectively. The 13-week (quarterly) 
moving averages are also shown on both graphs to illustrate longer-term tendencies. 
The results for the other two locations-los  Angeles and New York-are  available from the authors upon request. Vedenov, Duflield, and Wetzstein  Alternative Fuels in a Volatile U.S. Gasoline Market  7 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Conventional Gasoline and Ethanol Real 
Price Series for the Gulf Coast 
Fuel 
No. of  Minimum  Maximum  Mean 
Sample  a  Obsemations  ($1  ($1  ($1 
Conventional Gasoline  Full  757  0.771  1.724  1.071 
Gulf War  73  0.875  1.724  1.167 
Terrorism War  146  0.771  1.384  1.096 
Ethanol  Full  753  1.324  2.978  2.107 
Gulf War  73  1.472  2.348  2.024 
Terrorism War  144  1.324  2.421  1.820 
Note: Prices are normalized to July 2004  dollars. 
"Full, Gulf War, and Terrorism War samples include weekly observations from April 1989  through May 2004,  July 1990 
through December 1991,  and July 2001  through May 2004,  respectively. 
During this period, the conventional gasoline prices varied between $0.771 and $1.724 
(in 2004 dollars) with a mean of $1.071 (table 1).  As expected, both the Gulf War and 
Terrorism War subsamples were characterized by higher average prices than the full 
sample. The ethanol prices over this same period varied between $1.324 and $2.978 (in 
2004 dollars) with a mean of $2.107. However, the Gulf War and Terrorism War sub- 
samples had lower average prices than the full sample, reflecting the fact that changes 
in oil prices do not have a direct impact on ethanol. The graph of gasoline prices (figure 
1) exhibits visibly higher oscillation than the graph of  ethanol prices (figure 2). The 
moving average graph of gasoline prices also reflects the price asymmetry (Cook, 19991, 
as  the increases in gasoline prices are generally steeper than the declines. Both the Gulf 
War and Terrorism War periods are characterized by  increased volatility, and the 
Terrorism War period also exhibits substantial  upward movement of prices. In  contrast, 
the graph of ethanol prices (figure 2) exhibits less oscillation, and long-term changes in 
prices are less asymmetric. 
Unit-Root Analysis 
Before estimating the parameters of the Brownian motions, we tested gasoline and 
constructed ethanol blends (El0  and E15) price series for unit roots. Following Pindyck 
(1999), we ran the augmented Dickey-Fuller test with the time trend (t)  by estimating 
the following model: 
wherep, is  the  logarithm of corresponding  real price at  time t, A is the difference operator, 
and  N is the number of lags included in the model. The results of the tests are presented 
in table 2 for N = 1,2,  and 4. The case of N = 0 corresponds to the model with no differ- 
ence lags. Thep-values  used for significance testing are interpolated MacKinnon (1994) 
approximate critical values for the t-statistics on u. The hypothesis of a unit root is 
rejected for both the conventional gasoline and two ethanol blends. 8  April2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Figure 1. Conventional gasoline prices, Gulf Coast, 1989-2004 
(in July 2004 $) 
Figure 2. Ethanol prices, Gulf Coast, 1989-2004 (in  July 2004 $) Vedenov, Dujield, and Wetzstein  Alternative Fuels in a Volatile U.S.  Gasoline Market  9 
Table 2. Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit-Root Test and AR(1) 
Parameters 
Number of Time Difference Lags 
Fuel  t  u  t  u  t  u  t  u 
Gasoline  -0.156  -8.246  -0.147  -7.433  -0.142  -6.912  -0.142  -6.504 
El0  -0.195  -9.314  -0.189  -8.561  -0.183  -7.891  -0.184  -7.371 
El5  -0.208  -9.657  -0.203  -8.893  -0.196  -8.155  -0.198  -7.610 
Note: Coefficients for parameter u are all significantly different from zero at the 0.001 level. 
Estimation Procedures 
The parameters of geometric Brownian motions (2) and (3), along with the correlation 
coefficients (p), have been estimated for the three fuel-price  series: (a)  full sample, (b)  Gulf 
War subsample, and (c) Terrorism War subsample. Since the estimation procedure is 
identical for gasoline and ethanol blends, in the remainder of this section subscripts 
indicating types of fuel are omitted for the sake of brevity. 
According to Ito's lemma, the logarithm of a price variable following the geometric 
Brownian motion is described by the Brownian motion process: 
(12)  dp = (y - 1/202)dt  + odz = adt + odz. 
The respective maximum-likelihood estimators for the drift (a)  and volatility (0) in (12) 
are: 
where r, = Aptlpt is the first difference of the logarithm of corresponding real price at 
time t, and  n is the  number of observations (Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay, 1997,  p. 363). 
The volatility estimator can then be used directly for estimating volatilities of the geo- 
metric Brownian motions (2) and (3),  while the corresponding drifts (y)  can be estimated 
as: 
ji  = 2 + 1/$32. 
Results 
The estimation results for conventional gasoline and the two ethanol blends (El0  and 
El51  are summarized in table 3. Based on the full sample, the Gulf Coast gasoline price 
series has an average drift of 8% per year and a volatility of 41.8%. At the same time, the 
respective drift and volatility of  ethanol were only 1.5% and 25.2% per year. The corre- 
lation between the ethanol and gasoline prices in the full sample was 0.284, suggesting 
combinations of ethanol and gasoline would have lower volatility due to a portfolio effect. 10  April 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 3. Estimated Parameters of Geometric Brownian Motion 
Correlation with 
Drift  Volatility  Gasoline Prices 
Fuel  Sample "  (11)  (0)  (P) 
Gasoline  Full  0.080  0.418  1.000 
Gulf War  0.092  0.516  1.000 
Terrorism War  0.248  0.476  1.000 
Full  0.054  0.355  0.980 
Gulf War  0.052  0.462  0.991 
Terrorism War  0.196  0.417  0.989 
Full  0.045  0.332  0.970 
Gulf War  0.053  0.441  0.986 
Terrorism War  0.176  0.394  0.976 
Ethanol  Nl  0.015  0.252  0.284 
Gulf War  0.095  0.300  0.579 
Terrorism War  0.051  0.364  0.281 
"Full, Gulf War, and Terrorism War samples include weekly observations from April 1989  through May 2004,  July 1990 
through December 1991,  and July 2001  through May 2004,  respectively. 
The ethanol blends contain either an 85%  or 90%  proportion of gasoline, so their price 
series tend to behave similarly to the corresponding gasoline series. This is reflected 
both in similar patterns of  drift and volatility and in the correlations between the price 
series. However, due to low correlation between the ethanol and conventional  gasoline, 
both the drift and volatility of  the blends decline relative to conventional gasoline even 
with a small addition of  ethanol. For example, the price series for El5  exhibited a drift 
and volatility of  4.5% and 33.2%, compared to 5.4% and 35.5% for El0 and 8% and 
41.8% for conventional gasoline. As the percentage of  ethanol increases, both the drift 
and volatility decline, yielding more stable fuel prices for the economy. 
The parameters of  Brownian motions estimated on the two subsamples (Gulf and 
Terrorism Wars) confirm the initial hypothesis of higher drift and volatility of gasoline 
prices during these two disruptive periods. Conventional gasoline experienced the 
largest increases in drift and volatility as the result of  these disruptions, with the 
portfolio effect mitigating these price changes for El0  andE15. Regardless of individual 
patterns, the addition of  even a small amount of  ethanol resulted in a decrease in the 
price drift and volatility of the blends. 
The Terrorism War subsample yields the largest increases in drift, whereas the Gulf 
War period represents the period of highest volatility. The current tight supplies from 
oil refining and strong demand from developing countries, such as China and India, 
explain a major portion of the recent large increase in gasoline-price drift. The relatively 
high volatility in gasoline prices during the Gulf War reflects the initial spike in price 
at  the start of the war and then a subsequent decline following the war's short duration 
(figure 1).  A similar price pattern was not observed in the Terrorism War subsample, 
perhaps due to continuing duration of  military conflicts. More recent data reflecting 
dramatic increases in oil and gasoline prices in the second half of  2004, and especially 
during 2005, would probably manifest such a pattern more profoundly. Vedenov, Dufjeld, and Wetzstein  Alternative Fuels in a Volatile US.  Gasoline Market  11 
Table 4. Switching Threshold Prices for Ethanol Blends 
Discount Rate 
Ethanol  6%  8%  10% 
Fuels  Sample "  10 Years  20 Years  30 Years  20 Years  20 Years 
El0  Full  $1.524  $1.742  $1.997  $1.670  $1.615 
Gulf War  $1.476  $1.821  $2.263  $1.766  $1.714 
Terrorism War  $1.730  $2.665  $4.339  $2.556  $2.469 
-  Average Price 2001  -2004 = $1.169 - 
El5  Full  $1.640  $1.953  $2.327  $1.862  $1.790 
Gulf War  $1.571  $1.930  $2.389  $1.857  $1.793 
Terrorism War  $2.022  $3.654  $7.146  $3.476  $3.316 
-  Average Price 2001-2004  = $1.205 - 
Note: Prices are normalized to July 2004  dollars. 
"  Nl,  Gulf War, and Terrorism War samples include weekly observations from April 1989  through May 2004,  July 1990 
through December 1991,  and July 2001  through May 2004,  respectively. 
The estimated parameters of the price processes were used to calculate the switching 
thresholds (11)  for the two ethanol blends. Recall that these switching thresholds are 
the price levels below which it becomes economically optimal to adopt the alternative 
fuels. The thresholds are calculated for alternative combinations of  risk-free interest 
rates and time horizons (table 4). The average price levels of conventional gasoline and 
ethanol blends during 2001-2004 are used to convert the relative thresholds into dollar 
values (in July 2004 dollars). 
As indicated in table 4, the optimal thresholds increase in length of the time horizon 
and decrease in the discount rate. The intuition behind these results follows from 
interpretation of equation (7). Recall that the switching threshold is determined as a 
price which equates the total expected return from the switch and the expected capital 
appreciation. Further, from (6), higher thresholds result in lower expected return from 
the switch and vice versa. Longer time horizons increase the expected returns so that 
the switch is economically optimal even at  higher prices of the alternative  fuels. On the 
other hand, higher discount rates result in higher capital appreciation, which can be 
matched by the expected returns only when the switch occurs at  relatively low prices of 
alternative fuel. 
The thresholds for El5  are uniformly higher than the thresholds for E10, which is 
consistent with the fact that the former includes a higher proportion  of  the more 
expensive ethanol component than the latter. The average price of El0 over the years 
2001-2004  is $1.169, compared to $1.205 for E15. 
The main result of the analysis is that the average ethanol blend prices are  below the 
switching threshold for every scenario across all the sample periods, even without 
taking into account the 5.2~  federal motor fuel tax exemption. Thus, given the current 
price patterns, switching from conventional gasoline to either ethanol blend is an 
economically sound decision-provided  this does not decrease efficiency of the vehicle. 
Furthermore, the increased drift and volatility of gasoline prices in recent years make 
such a switch even more attractive and economically justified. 
This result differs directly from the findings of Tareen,  Wetzstein, and Duffield (2000) 
for biodiesel, who determined that  the price trigger for adopting biodiesel was above the 12  April 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
current market price for biodiesel. Thus, in contrast to biodiesel, ethanol blended fuels 
are currently price-competitive, which at  least partially explains the substantial recent 
growth in this industry. The continuing hunger for oil by  developed countries, the 
marked increase in oil consumption by  developing countries, and projections of  oil 
production peaking in this century are signals that the current drift and volatility in 
gasoline prices may not be a short-run occurrence. Consequently, this competitive price 
advantage of ethanol blends is likely to continue into the future. 
While wholesale purchasers of fuel can hedge their exposure to fuel price volatility 
by using market-traded instruments (e.g., options and other derivatives), such an 
approach involves transaction costs and additional expenses associated with develop- 
ment and implementation of hedging strategies. Alternative fuels, on the other hand, 
provide a low-cost natural hedging capacity due to a portfolio effect. 
Policy Implications 
and Concluding Remarks 
The macroeconomic stumbles from petroleum price volatility  are of  major concern, 
particularly since the energy crisis of the 1970s and ensuing military conflicts in the 
Middle East. In response to these concerns, Congress has enacted a number of energy 
policies including the National Energy Act of 1998,  the Energy Conservation Reauthor- 
ization Act of  1998, the Energy Policy Act of  1992, and most recently the Domenici- 
Barton Energy Policy Act of 2005. 
Alternative fuels such as ethanol blends exhibit lower price volatility than 
conventional gasoline due to the pol-tfolio effect. This analysis has demonstrated that 
this lower price volatility of  alternative fuels, combined with increasing levels and 
volatility of prices of conventional gasoline, should result in market conditions receptive 
to government incentives geared toward widespread adoption of renewable fuels. The 
results also emphasize the importance of taking into account the portfolio effect, as  the 
impact of government incentives may be underestimated if the portfolio  effect is ignored. 
The average conventional gasoline price for the Terrorism War subperiod (2001-2004) 
is $1.096 (table 1).  Comparing this to the average price of El0  ($1.169) or El5  ($1.205) 
over the same period (table 4), one would conclude incorrectly (given these alternative 
fuel prices are higher than conventional gasoline prices) that additional subsidies may 
be warranted to facilitate adoption. 
Hence, a major implication of this analysis is that policy makers should be consider- 
ing price volatility and associated portfolio effects when advocating spending levels for 
alternative fuel programs. As an  example, the cost of reducing price volatility by using 
E10, based on a 6% discount rate and a 10-year life, is the difference in the mean 
Terrorism War price of  gasoline of  $1.096 and the El0 average price of  $1.169, i.e., 
$0.073. In  contrast, the benefit to agents from reduced volatility is the difference between 
this average price of El0  and the switching threshold for the full sample of $1.524, i.e., 
$0.355. Thus, the adoption of  El0 has a benefit-to-cost ratio of  35.517.3 = 4.87. This 
value can aid in estimating the cost and benefits of  tax credits and other economic 
incentives for alternative fuels. 
In addition to macroeconomic stability benefits, more widespread adoption of ethanol 
blends may help the United States achieve its air quality goals and reduce emissions 
of greenhouse gasses. Further research is required for estimating the value of these Vedenov,  Duffield, and Wetzstein  Alternative Fuels in a Volatile US.  Gasoline Market  13 
environmental benefits in order to make accurate cost and benefit comparisons between 
conventional and alternative fuels. Combining  the  macroeconomic  stability benefits with 
the environmental benefits of  ethanol blends could increase their value considerably. 
[Received  April 2005;Jinal revision received January 2006.1 
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